01218nam a22001697a 4500 190323b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d 0304-405X CEO attributes, compensation, and firm value: Evidence from a structural estimation / by T. Beau Page T. Beau Page Amsterdam Elsevier May 2018 Pages 378-401 Journal of Financial Economics 128 (2) 0304-405X Abstract I present and estimate a dynamic model of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and effort provision. I find that variation in CEO attributes explains the majority of variation in compensation (equity and total) but little of the variation in firm value. The primary drivers of cross-sectional compensation are risk aversion and influence on the board. Additionally, I estimate the magnitude of CEO agency issues. Removing CEO influence increases shareholder value in the typical firm by 1.74%, making CEOs risk neutral increases shareholder value by 16.12%, and removing all agency frictions increases shareholder value by 28.99%. CEO compensation Dynamic principal-agent model Structural estimation lcc SE 361358 361358 0 0 lcc 0 CL CL PER 2019-03-23 0 2019-03-23 00:00:00 2019-03-23 SE